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 The use of symbolism in mathematics is probably the mostly quoted reason 
people use for explaining their lack of understanding and difficulties in learning 
mathematics. We will consider symbolism as a conceptual barrier drawing on some 
recent findings in historical epistemology and cognitive psychology. Instead of relying 
on the narrow psychological interpretation of epistemic obstacles we use the barrier 
for situating symbolism in the ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’-debate. Drawing on 
a recent study within historical epistemology we show how early symbolism           
functioned in a way similar to concrete operational schemes. Furthermore we will    
discuss several studies from cognitive psychology which come to the conclusion that 
symbolism is not as abstract and arbitrary as one considers but often relies on       
perceptually organized grouping and concrete spatial relations. We will use           
operations on fractions to show that the reliance on concrete spatial operations also 
provides opportunities for teaching. We will conclude arguing that a better conceptual 
understanding of symbolism by teachers will prepare them for possible difficulties that 
students will be confronted with in the classroom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 People who express their aversion against mathematics often quote its reliance 
on symbolism as the main reason for their distaste. They may be good at arithmetical 
calculations or geometrical constructions but once mathematical symbolism becomes 
necessary it puts them off. The amount of (popular) literature attempting to expound 
principles of mathematics without the use of symbolism is just overwhelming.          
For mathematics education it is an important question when and how to introduce       
symbolism within the curriculum. If it is introduced too early, students may lack the 
maturity to understand and reason symbolically. If it is introduced too late, some 
mathematical methods and concepts cannot be taught as they rely on symbolism. 
 In this paper we will consider symbolism as an obstacle in learning           
mathematics in the same way it has been a barrier in the historical development of 
mathematics. In a first section, the difference between epistemic obstacles and     
conceptual barriers will be discussed and related to the ‘ontogeny recapitulates      
phylogeny’-debate. In a second section, we will provide some evidence from the    
history of mathematics on how the emergence of algebraic symbolism during the   
sixteenth century depended on earlier developments in the justification of arithmetical 
procedures and operations by means of graphical schemes. In a third section,       
evidence from cognitive psychology will be presented to argue that symbolism is not 
as abstract and arbitrary as one considers but often relies on perceptually organized 
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grouping and concrete spatial relations. From this we will conclude that the            
unexpected concrete perceptual features of symbolism provides threats as well as 
opportunities for mathematics education.  
 
EPISTEMIC OBSTACLES AND CONCEPTUAL BARRIERS IN LEARNING 
 When discussing students’ problems with mathematical symbolism we cannot 
pass by the ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’-debate. Some authors have taken the 
position that there is a strong parallel between the historical development of       
mathematical concepts and the acquisition of mathematical notions and concepts in 
the cognitive development of children. The parallel can go in both directions.             
In Psychogenèse et histoire des sciences, Piaget and Garcia (1983) identify major    
transitional mechanisms in geometry and algebra and relate them to the three       
development stages in Piaget’s theory of psychogenesis. Their account of the 3000 
year history of algebra identifies major stages of its historic development with the 
three corresponding stages of cognitive development. The first (long) period was only 
concerned with “solutions to specific equations. The methods used were purely       
empirical, trial-and-error. Each equation was treated as a separate object. This is   
undoubtedly an intraoperational period” (ibid, 166). The second, interoperational   
period started in the eighteenth century and covers Lagrange and Gauss. This period 
is characterized by “transformations of equations that allow the reduction of an      
unsolvable form to one that is solvable” (ibid.). Finally, the transoperational period 
originates with the group theory of Galois (1811-1832), going from equations to more 
abstract structures. This approach by Piaget has received little support from          
historians or scholars working on the crossover between history and pedagogy of 
mathematics. 
 Far more accepted is the idea that conceptual difficulties in the historical      
development of mathematics may be reflected in mathematics education. The most 
common framework for approaching this parallel is that of epistemological obstacles, 
a term coined in 1938 by Bachelard within the context of history of science. The term 
originally refers to misleading elements blocking the rational process of advancement 
of science. The idea was adapted by Brousseau (1976) for use in mathematics     
education. Brousseau attributes a positive function to epistemological obstacles within 
his didactical project. He considers such obstacles more as a piece of mathematical 
knowledge rather than a lack of knowledge. He identifies them in the history of   
mathematics as well as students’ spontaneous models. In classroom situations they 
do not appear as erratic or unexpected errors, but as predictable ones. In a reaction 
to Brousseau, Glaeser (1981) listed a number of epistemological obstacles including 
the “inability to manipulate isolated negative quantities” and “the difficulty of giving 
meaning to isolated negative quantities”. While the idea of epistemological obstacles 
is still at the forefront in the ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’-debate, several      
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authors have called for caution and warned that the parallelism should not be taken 
all too literally. Herscovics (1989) pointed out that the conditions under which         
concepts are thought in today’s classroom are quite different from the historical        
conditions in which these concepts matured. Thomaidis and Tzanakis (2007) in          
a study on the use of the number line conclude that a strict parallelism is untenable 
and propose a more subtle one.  
 While we believe in a strong parallelism between history and education for 
some intrinsic difficult concepts such as symbolic reasoning, it is not necessary to 
resort to epistemological obstacles as a theoretical framework. We see two main    
objections against the concept. Within the context of history, epistemological         
obstacles are often viewed as blocking factors within a teleological evolution of 
mathematics. Such a view is considered dubious from a current perspective of   
mathematical practice which attributes a high degree of contingency to the            
development of mathematics. On the level of mathematics education, epistemological       
obstacles are mostly situated on the psychological level. Current scholarship takes 
into account a much broader contextual perspective including sociological and      
cultural conventions as well as norms and values. A useful alternative to                
epistemological obstacles is available from the history of science. An interesting    
phenomenon in scientific discovery is simultaneous discovery. A good example of this 
is the discovery of the sine law of refraction. As is now established, the sine law was 
discovered independently by Thomas Harriot around 1602, by Willebrord Snellius in 
1621 and by René Descartes between 1626 and 1628. Descartes was the first to 
publish the law in his Dioptrique of 1637. With accurate data available since Ptolemy 
(2
nd
 century AD), why did it take fifteen centuries to come to the sine law?              
Furthermore, why did several individuals came to the discovery within a matter of      
a few decades? The barrier theory by Margolis (1993) provides a framework for the 
understanding of such historical cases. Habits of minds govern our cognitive         
processes and are similar to what Polanyi called ‘tacit knowledge’. They can be     
considered critical intuitions within a community and are therefore constitutive of        
a paradigm. A barrier is an entrenched habit of mind that can block a cognitive       
breakthrough. In relation to our subject, the cognitive barrier is symbolic reasoning. It 
took about two centuries from a first acceptance of isolated negative quantities to      
a fully symbolic treatment of the operations involved. Particularly for symbolic            
reasoning, the conceptual barrier functions in two directions. The conceptual distance 
between the prevailing arithmetical interpretation of abbaco algebra and the          
conflicting new ideas about symbolic reasoning in the sixteenth century determined 
the long historical process of difficulties. In the reverse direction, we are now so     
accustomed to symbolic reasoning that it becomes equally difficult to understand    
non-symbolic reasoning in algebraic treatises before Descartes. 
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 In the discussion that follows, we will consider the symbolic treatment of    
negative quantities and operations on negative quantities as a conceptual barrier.  
We would like to argue that it is not so much the concept of negative quantities in  
itself that has led to problems and conflicts but rather the idea that negative quantities 
and their operations should be considered on a symbolic and abstract level. This will 
lead us to the conclusion that operations on negative quantities are best introduced in 
mathematics education within the context of symbolic algebra. 
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON EARLY SYMBOLISM 
 It is difficult to pinpoint an exact date or era for the emergence of algebraic 
symbolism in the history of mathematics. It certainly was a convoluted process      
involving many actors in different cultures and covering a period of several centuries 
(Heeffer 2012). The most important developments took place in Renaissance Europe 
during the sixteenth century, culminating in the Geometry by Descartes (1637). This 
book was the first to introduce our current use of x, y  and z together with exponents 
of unknowns. However, as argued by Heeffer (2013) the transition towards symbolic 
mathematics involved a process of epistemic justification and abstraction which was 
prepared by the European abbaco tradition flourishing in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. The major innovation during this period was the justification of the          
correctness of procedures, by which pre-symbolic algebra became liberated from 
constraints which accounted for the values of the quantities being operated upon. 
Algebraic procedures before the sixteenth century avoided negative terms (as in the 
rules for solving ‘equations’) and negative quantities as solutions of linear and      
quadratic problems. Earlier texts, such as the Arithmetica of Diophantus even avoided 
irrational solutions. In order to circumvent such anomalous solutions, one had to   
account for the values of the unknown while performing the calculations. With the      
justification of procedures during the abbaco period, the belief in the correctness    
became sufficient during the sixteenth century to allow for negative and even     
imaginary solutions (as in Cardano’s Ars Magnae of 1545). 
 Lacking a symbolic language, abbaco masters devised graphical schemes to 
explain, teach and justify basic operations of arithmetic. One such scheme, shown in 
Figure 1, deals with operations on fractions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 1. scheme for the division of fractions 
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 This scheme explains how to divide one fraction by another, but the same    
spatial layout is also used for addition, multiplication and subtraction of fractions 
(Heeffer, 2013). It exploits the symbolism of the fractions bar which originated in the 
Maghreb region of the medieval Arab world and which was disseminated through the 
early the abbaco tradition (Høyrup 2010). The scheme displays intermediate results 
such as 9, the product 3 x 3 and 8, the product 4 x 2. The final quantity 1 1/8 is the 
result of dividing 9 by 8. However, the scheme also shows 12, the product of the    
denominators, not necessary in the calculation. This is one of the several arguments 
to attribute an epistemic function to this practice of adding non-discursive elements to 
abbaco treatises.  
 Schemes for the multiplication of combined fractions were extended to the   
multiplication of binomials by Maestro Gherardi’s Libro di ragioni of 1328 (Arrighi 
1987). Instead of bringing 12 ½ and 15 ¼ to a common denominator, he considers 
the two fractions as binomials (12 + ½) and (15 + ¼), each the sum of a whole     
number (numero sano) and a broken number (rocti).The method of crosswise       
multiplication, the reference to a cross (croce) and the non-discursive use of              
a configuration of schematic elements, appears frequently in abbaco texts during the 
following two centuries. Maestro Dardi was the first to devise a more elaborate 
scheme in which the four products are indicated by individual line segments (Franci, 
2001). His comprehensive text on algebra, the Aliabra argibra, is preceded by            
a separate treatise dealing with operations on surds “Trattato dele regulele quale     
appartiene a le multiplicatione, a le divitione, a le agiuntione e a le sottratione dele 
radice”. The multiplication is illustrated by the scheme shown 
in Figure 2. It states that  
 
  
 Figure 2. Dardi’s scheme for multiplying surd binomials (Chigi, M.VIII.170, f. 4v) 
 
 The scheme for binomial multiplication shares all the characteristics of the 
schemes for operations on fractions and leads us to conclude that it serves the same 
function of epistemic justification of the discursive explanations. 
 Interestingly, in the same introduction Dardi also uses the scheme for a very 
different purpose, to provide a “prove” for the rules of sign (see Figure 3): 
)74)(53( 
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Figure 3. Dardi's use of a justification scheme for proving the rules of sign 
 
 The reasoning is as follows: we know that 8 times 8 makes 64. Therefore       
(10 – 2) times (10 – 2) should also result in 64. You multiply 10 by 10, this makes 
100, then 10 times – 2 which is – 20 and again 10 times – 2 or – 20 leaves us with 60. 
The last product is (– 2)( –2) but as we have to arrive at 64, this must necessarily be 
+4. Therefore a negative multiplied by a negative always makes a positive. 
 The use of a general justification scheme for something as crucial as the laws 
of signs in arithmetic is quite significant. Firstly, it again shows the unifying power of 
such schemes. The crosswise multiplication of binomials is applied to sums and     
differences of natural numbers, as well as rational numbers and surd numbers.     
Operations on different kinds of numbers can be justified by one single scheme.    
Secondly, precisely because of the belief that the operations represented by such      
a scheme must be correct, it becomes possible to “prove” something as essential as 
the laws of signs. A negative multiplied by a negative must be a positive because of 
the validity of this scheme for multiplying binomials. Thirdly, a “proof” like this one of 
Dardi may seem trivial, but it is not. The reasons for the suitability of this scheme for 
“proving” the rules of sign go deep. If one wants to go from an arithmetic which is   
limited to natural numbers  –  as is basically the Arithmetica of Diophantus – to an    
arithmetic which includes the integers, you have to preserve the law of distribution 
and the law of identity for multiplication. Precisely these two laws are at play in the 
multiplication of binomials. 
EVIDENCE FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
 We will now look at some studies on the way symbolism functions at the      
cognitive level. It is a generally considered that mathematical symbolism uses an   
arbitrary set of signs to represent mathematical concepts and relations. Such        
formalist attitude to mathematics, attributed to David Hilbert, is often described by 
considering mathematics as “nothing but a game with meaningless symbols following 
meaningless rules”. Historical studies on mathematical symbolism already provide 
evidence against the widely held view that symbols emerged in an arbitrary way, but 
now additional evidence comes from research in cognitive psychology. Supported by 
a series of experimental studies, David Landy proposed “the revised physical symbol 
systems hypothesis” in which “symbols are not arbitrary, unconstrained tokens but 
rather are represented and processed using space and perceptually organized 
groups. This conception of physical symbols makes them far more constrained” than 
10
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generally thought of (Landy 2007: 2039). Instead of viewing symbolic representations 
as lexical or sentential expressions, on a cognitive level it would be more accurate to 
consider them as diagrammatic and non-discursive representations. This confirms our 
view of early algebraic symbolism in abbaco treatises as a historical consequence of 
non-discursive schemes for the justification of operations (Heeffer 2013). Let us     
illustrate the revised physical symbol systems hypothesis by a single experiment   
directly relevant for mathematics education, as shown in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4. Sample stimuli from Landy & Goldstone (2007a) illustrating the effects of 
different sorts of proximity groupings in parsing symbolic expressions  
 
 Students often make mistakes against the order of operations when performing 
calculations or solving algebraic problems. The examples shown in Figure 4 will    
certainly look familiar to mathematics teachers. Mistakes in operator precedence    
appear to be induced not only by spatial proximities as in the top expression, but also 
by other types of proximity relations such as common region, connectedness, and 
even alphabetic proximity as shown in the lower expressions. Such experimental   
results on the effect of spatial organization and non-spatial grouping relations        
suggests that we perceive mathematical expressions in some concrete physical way 
rather than abstract structures that follow precise rules and syntactical relations. 
Other experimental setups as in Landy and Goldstone (2009) account for background 
motion of random dots which either impede or facilitate the solution to algebraic    
expressions depending on the directionality of the movement. Evidence that       
movement and directionality influences our interpretation of algebraic expressions 
provides us with strong arguments against a simple formalist view on mathematics. 
CONCLUSION: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MATHEMATICS  
EDUCATION 
 We have considered symbolism as a conceptual barrier in the history of   
mathematics and as well as in learning mathematics. We have provided evidence that 
the earliest historical development of symbolism functioned in the same way as    
concrete schemes for justifying operations, such as operations on fractions and 
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crosswise multiplication of binomials. The first explicit use of symbolism shows     
symbolic solutions to algebraic problems as non-discursive elements in abbaco    
treatises having the same epistemic function as graphical schemes for operations. 
 We have further referred to cognitive studies which strongly suggest that our 
current symbolism is not as arbitrary as often considered but instead relies on       
concrete spatial groupings, different layers of proximity relations, directionality and 
even motion. What are the consequences of these findings for the education of 
mathematics, specifically the introduction of symbolism? 
 Our current understanding of symbolism, from the history of mathematics and 
from cognitive psychology, provides us with a picture that poses threats as well as 
opportunities for the mathematics curriculum. Firstly, teachers should be aware of the 
fact that symbolism does not act in a completely neutral and abstract way. An insight 
in the way how perceptual processes direct our understanding of symbolism prepares 
teachers for possible mistakes and difficulties in classroom practice. The different 
types proximity groupings listed in Figure 4 illustrate how perceptual processes     
induce typical mistakes against the rules of operator precedencies. Ignoring or      
neglecting the perceptual basis of symbolism thus poses a threat for mathematics 
education. 
 On the other hand, the fact that symbolism is partly based on spatial            
organization, proximity relations, directionality and concrete physical structures also 
opens up new opportunities for mathematics education. Landy, Brookes and Smout 
(2011: 107) suggest the use of “interpretation routes” that exploit these properties of 
symbolism: 
 Rather than trying to instruct students that physical structure is irrelevant, or 
exclusively focusing on the intra mathematical articulation of implications, it may be 
possible to help students understand equations as sensible utterances by providing 
interpretation routes (i.e., mappings onto natural-language descriptions or imagistic 
models) that are both interpretable and maintain concrete relational structure. That is, 
rather than seeing mappings like this as a shortcut to be averted, we can see them as 
a route to potential understanding. 
 In the same way that abbaco masters employed the earliest symbols, such as 
the fraction bar, by devising schemes around it exploiting the spatial organization of 
nominators and denominators for justification as well as for teaching, so can concrete 
relational structures in contemporary symbolism be exploited for new and innovative 
ways of teaching. 
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